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INTRODUCTION

The technological landscape of the healthcare industry is evolving at a
rapid and unprecedented pace.1 Increasingly dominated by connected medical
devices, the healthcare sector is in the midst of a massive transformation to its
approach to patient outcomes and value-based care. 2 Medical technology
(MedTech), situated at the heart of this revolution, has the potential to
significantly improve healthcare efficiency, convenience, and patient comfort,
while also positively impacting quality of life. 3 However, MedTech is not
without its vulnerabilities, and as connected medical devices become the norm
in patient care settings, the risks for hacking and malicious attacks on these
devices increase exponentially. 4
As the new frontiers of MedTech continue to expand, one particular sector
of the digital health industry has garnered significant attention: The Internet
of Medical Things (IoMT). At its most basic, IoMT refers to the ability of
healthcare devices to communicate, gather, and exchange data across WiFi
and Internet platforms.' These devices can provide up-to-date patient
information, enhance patient self-sufficiency, and decrease the cost of care.6
WiFi-connected pacemakers, insulin pumps, and pill-shaped cameras are only
the most recent examples of what this technology is projected to accomplish. 7
By 2025, experts estimate the impact of IoMT on the healthcare industry will

1.
How Technology is Changing Healthcare, TEX. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.txhealthcare.com/health-news/how-technology-is-changing-healthcare/58/
[https://penna.cc/CTC7-MLB6].
2.
See KAREN TAYLOR, DELOITTE CENTRE FOR HEALTH SOLS., CONNECTED HEALTH:
How DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY Is TRANSFORMING HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE 4-11 (2015).
3.
See MARIE-VALENTINE FLORIN, GOVERNING CYBER SECURITY RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS: APPLICATION TO CONNECTED VEHICLES AND

MEDICAL DEVICES 5, 7 (Maya Bundt et al. eds., 2016).
4.
Alaap Shah, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Cybersecurity Risk in the Health Care
Internet

of

Things,

AM.

HEALTH

LAWS.

ASS'N

WKLY.

(May

18,

2018),

https://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2018/05/AHLA-Weekly-Cybersecurity-IOT-AlaapShah-May-2018.pdf [https://penna .cc/UGN5-W9TQ]; Untangling the Web ofLiability in the
Internet of Things, MASON HAYES & CURRAN: TECH L. BLOG (May 19, 2016) [hereinafter
Untangling the Web], https://www.mhc.ie/latest/blog/untangling-the-web-of-liability-in-theinternet-of-things [https://penna.cc/XWB3-6ED9].
5.
Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issuesfor
Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REv. 29, 33 (2016).
6.
Id. at 32-33; see also Bernard Marr, Why The InternetofMedical Things (loMT) Will
Start to Transform Healthcare in 2018, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmarr/2018/01/25/why-the-internet-of-medical-things-iomt-will-start-to-transfonnhealthcare-in-2018/#1df6e3d4a3c [https://perna.cc/Y4VQ-F222].
7.
Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 32.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss1/4
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range from $1.1 trillion to $2.5 trillion per year, mostly stemming from
improved efficiency in treating chronically ill patients.8
As a subset of the Internet of Things (JoT), the loMT ecosystem is unique
from prior technology in that it "hinges on the interconnectivity of countless
devices and participants," which requires the legal framework governing
loMT to account for the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of numerous
stakeholders. 9 Given the nascent stage of loMT, however, a comprehensive
legal and liability structure does not yet exist for hacks, breaches, and hijacks
of loMT devices that cause harm to patients.' 0 Privacy and security
regulations in the United States are sectoral and patchwork in nature, and
those applicable to the healthcare sector have not been regularly updated to
reflect the technological innovation associated with digital health." As a
result, significant gaps exist in healthcare regulations for loMT devices, with
some aspects of the industry completely unregulated.12
Compounding this issue of non-regulation is the lack of a comprehensive
liability framework for patients to follow if their loMT device is hacked or
malfunctions.' 3 With numerous developers, suppliers, and manufacturers
involved in the loMT supply chain, it can be difficult for patients to identify
the culpable party and apply existing liability standards to innovative
technology. '4 While products liability currently serves as the primary vehicle
for restitution if a device malfunctions, its application to loMT is imperfect at
best. " Apportioning liability between software and device manufacturers in
an loMT product can be difficult, and there are no clear boundaries to establish

8.
9.
10.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29; see also H. Michael O'Brien, The Internet of Things and the Inevitable

Collisionwith ProductLiability PART4: Government Oversight, PROD. LLAB. ADVOC. (Oct. 16,

2015),
https://www.productliabilityadvocate.com/2015/10/the-internet-of-things-and-the-ine
vitable-collision-with-product-liability-part-4-governiment-oversight/ [https://penna.cc/R9YRP5W5].

11.

Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 40.

12. PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., NSTAC REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS 6 (Nov. 19, 2014); Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers
May Clean Your Clothes, But Hacks Can Clean Out Your Privacy, and Underdeveloped
Regulations Could Leave You Hanging on a Line, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY

L. 259, 260 (2016).
13. SALEN CHURI ET AL., UNIV. CHI. L. SCH., INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) RISK
MANAGER CHECKLIST, U.S. 4 (2017).
14. See BENJAMIN C. DEAN, AN EXPLORATION OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
THE INTERNET OF THINGS 12-13, 21 (2018). See generally Untangling the Web, supra note 4

("Lawmakers and regulators will need to consider either new forms of liability, or new ways to
manage and apply existing laws to different entities in the loT supply chain.").
15. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 16; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 58.
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which party is at fault for a hack or breach.1 6 Moreover, defect-free software
does not exist, which complicates the application of strict products liability to
software companies (assuming embedded software can even be considered its
own separate product to trigger application of products liability standards).' 7
Further, the prevalence of end-user licensing agreements operates as a
contractual tool to limit manufacturer liability for unsecure devices."' These
agreements, which appear in many loMT products and disclaim all liability
for software failures, shift the risk of harm almost exclusively to consumers,
and eliminate the burden for manufacturers to comply with industry best
practices for cybersecurity and privacy.1 9 The presence of these agreements
hinders consumers' ability to bring product liability or breach of warranty
actions, making restitution and recovery all but moot points. 20 Combined with
the restrictions of the economic loss doctrine, which precludes tort recovery
for purely financial harm, products liability (in its current form) is an almost
unworkable liability structure for loMT devices. 2 1 Not to mention, the
products liability model risks exposing healthcare providers and loMT device
manufacturers to unbounded liability despite the lack of mandatory federal
cybersecurity guidance and adherence to industry cybersecurity
frameworks.

22

Given the projected growth in the loMT market over the coming years,
new or revised liability models will undoubtedly develop as cases make their

16. See Untanglingthe Web, supra note 4.
17. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 17, 19; Paez & LaMarca, supra note 5, at 59; JonEvans,
Should Software CompaniesBe Legally Liable for Security Breaches?, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 6,

2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/06/should-software-companies-be-legally-liable-forsecurity-breaches/ [https://perna.cc/FV86-2HY3].
18. See Robert Lemos, Security Liability is Coming for Software: Is Your Engineering
Team Ready?, TECH BEACON, https://techbeacon.com/software-security-liability-coming-are-

your-engineers-ready [https://penna.cc/G22R-XA2C].
19. Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time
Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 427 (2008); Paul Rosenzweig, The Evolving Landscape of
Cybersecurity Liability, CHERTOFF GROUP (June 29, 2017), https://www.chertoffgroup.com/

blog/the-evolving-landscape-of-cybersecurity-liability [https://perma.cc/TXE6-JV3Y].
20. Dawn Beery & Kevin Burns, The Application of TraditionalProductLiability Law
to Emerging Technologies, DEFENSE, Apr. 2018, at 58.
21. Id. at 55; see also Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure)
Things: Should ManufacturersBe Liablefor Damage Causedby Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 913, 915, 926-27 (2017).
22. See generally Jack Detsch, Should Companies Be Held Liablefor Software Flaws?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/

1202/Should-companies-be-held-liable-for-software-flaws
[https://perma.cc/8HGP-CW3K]
(discussing the benefits and drawbacks of holding companies liable for software flaws).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss1/4
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way through the court system. 23 As liability standards evolve, there must be
an increased recognition that healthcare organizations and JoMT
manufacturers are victims of cyberattacks and heightened emphasis should be
placed on the proactive adoption of cybersecurity best practices.

24

That said,

there is also a need to counterbalance these considerations against the
requirements of patient safety and secure medical devices.

25

The existing

regulatory gaps and liability frameworks have resulted in insufficient
incentives to ensure adequate security measures are implemented into JoMT
software to protect patients from hacks, hijacks, and breaches. 26 In a climate
where a breach or hack can produce life or death consequences, it is
imperative to develop well-defined security standards and liability
expectations.27
Although it is impossible to predict at this stage the form of any new
JoMT liability structure, two proposals merit consideration as incremental

steps towards the new liability framework. First, end-user agreements that
limit a software manufacturer's liability for vulnerable code should be
prohibited in the JoMT context.28 The unique risk of bodily harm posed by
certain JoMT devices requires a corresponding liability system that will hold
software manufacturers accountable for their failure to implement security
best practices.

29

End-user agreements operate as an impediment to this goal

23.

See generally Mildred Segura et al., The Internet of Medical Things Raises Novel
Challenges,
MED.
DEVICE
ONLINE
(Jan.
3,
2018),
https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/the-internet-of-medical-things-raises-novel-complianc
e-challenges-0001 [https://penna.cc/D7TV-NX3W] (acknowledging with the growth of loMT
manufacturers should "keep abreast of current minimum-security standards" to avoid lawsuits);
Untanglingthe Web, supra note 4.
24. See MEGAN BROWN ET AL., CYBER IMPERATIVE: PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 12 (2018).
25. See Detsch, supra note 22.
26. See generally Charlie Mitchell, Mark WarnerEyes Liabilityfor Software Developers
as Key Way to Shore up Cybersecurity, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/technology/mark-warner-eyes-liability-forsoftware-developers-as-key-way-to-shore-up-cybersecurity [https://penna.cc/LAT8-DBY2].
27. See Untanglingthe Web, supra note 4.
28. See Lemos, supra note 18; see also Matthew Ashton, Note, Debugging the Real
World: Robust CriminalProsecutionin the Internetof Things, 59 ARIz. L. REV. 805, 834 (2017);
Mitchell, supra note 26.
29. See generallyMitchell, supra note 26 (suggesting a cybersecurity doctrine should be
implemented to include software liability); Detsch, supra note 22 ("[L]eading digital security
experts are calling on US policymakers to hold manufacturers liable for software vulnerabilities
in their products in an effort to prevent the bugs commonly found in smartphones and desktops
from pervading the emerging loT space.").
Compliance

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
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and shield software developers from accountability. 30 Software companies
would almost certainly resist this course of action with a stringent warning
that such liability would open the floodgates for judicial lawsuits and stifle
innovation in a developing industry. 3' Thus, a second proposal should be
simultaneously implemented that guards against unfettered liability for loMT
device manufacturers that adopt cybersecurity best practices. 3 2 Specifically, a
"safe harbor" statute should be adopted that limits civil liability if loMT
manufacturers and software companies comply with voluntary, industryapproved cybersecurity frameworks.3 3 These proposals help balance
incentives with punishment and can result in safer loMT products for
patients. 34
Further, by implementing small changes to the loMT liability structure at
this stage-without waiting for a liability scheme to be developed exclusively
by the federal or state legislatures or the courts-loMT companies and
healthcare organizations can contribute to the dialogue on what an end-stage
liability framework should entail. 3 Removing the protection afforded through
end-user agreements can incentivize loMT manufacturers to help form
liability standards and best practice expectations that will continue to govern
this evolving industry through public-private stakeholder participation.3 6
These companies may additionally be motivated to adopt and adhere to
existing cybersecurity frameworks, which may reduce the companies'
compliance burden when new loMT-specific standards are eventually
promulgated.

30. See Mitchell, supra note 26.
31. See id; John Daley, Note, Insecure Software is Eating the World: Promoting
Cybersecurity in an Age of Ubiquitous Software-Embedded Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.

&

533, 542 (2016) ("Critics will contend that any liability borne by software vendors will
extinguish the vibrant startup ecosystem.").
32. See Daley, supra note 31, at 541.
33. See generally id. (describing an alternate safe harbor model); Mauricio Paez
Kerianne Tobitsch, The Industrial Internet of Things: Risks, Liabilities, and Emerging Legal
Issues, 62 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 217, 228 (2018); Scott Wenzel, Not Even Remotely Liable: Smart
Car Hacking Liability, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 49, 69.

34. See generally Daley, supra note 31, at 541 (discussing the need to incentivize
cybersecurity practices and proposing a separate safe-harbor liability structure).
35. See generally Mitchell, supra note 26 (explaining that a dialogue must be started on
incentivizing software companies to develop secure code, and liability may contribute to this
incentive model); Paul Merrion, Litigation Key to Securing Internet of Things, Capitol Hill
Staffers Told, CQROLL CALL, June 8, 2017, 2017 WL 2470487.

36. See generally Mitchell, supra note 26 (relying on software maker's user license
agreements, courts have found in favor of software developers in civil suits); Merrion, supra
note 35.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss1/4

6

Corbin: When "Things" Go Wrong: Redefining Liability for the Internet of
2019]

REDEFINING LIABILITY FOR THE INTERNET OF MEDICAL THINGS

7

To support this two-pronged proposal, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part II offers a succinct introduction to JoMT, including the mechanics of how
JoMT works and the benefits and vulnerabilities associated with these devices.
Part III then explains the need to incentivize safer coding in these devices,
focusing particularly on regulatory gaps for JoMT accountability and liability.
This part highlights the strengths and weaknesses of regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), along with the development and role of
voluntary, industry-developed cybersecurity frameworks. Part IV discusses
the need for a comprehensive liability framework to incentivize safer coding,
describing why current liability structures are insufficient to govern and
mitigate the risks posed by these digital health devices. This part presents the
benefits and drawbacks of implementing the two-pronged liability model and
articulates why such revisions are urgently needed in the IoMT industry.
Finally, Part V concludes the Article.
II.

UNDERSTANDING IOMT: BACKGROUND, BENEFITS, AND
VULNERABILITIES

The technological revolution has taken the healthcare sector by storm.3 7
Once perceived as mere science fiction, digital health has transformed
imagination into reality with the advent of implantable, Internet-connected
medical devices that not only monitor patient health, but also gather and
exchange data across wireless networks with little human involvement.38
Revolutionizing both patient behavior and the practice of medicine, the
"smart" medical device industry is projected to be worth over $66 billion by
2024.39 Indeed, experts anticipate that by 2026, approximately one-third of
Americans will have either temporary or permanent healthcare devices in their
bodies. 40 As the human body becomes increasingly connected to the
Internet-a phenomenon that some deem the "next logical frontier" of digital
health-it is crucial to understand the benefits and vulnerabilities of this

37. Untangling the Web, supra note 4; see Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 238; see
also; Davenport, supra note 12, at 260; Shah, supra note 4 (explaining that "[h]ealth care
continues to undergo lightning-fast transformation," particularly as it "enter[s] the brave new
world of the Internet of Things").
38. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination,Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 92 (2014).
39. Tarifa B. Laddon & Blake A. Angelino, MedicalDevice Litigation: The "Internet of
Things is Coming, " IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Summer 2017, at 26, 26.
40. Amelia R. Montgomery, Note, Just What the Doctor Ordered: ProtectingPrivacy
Without Impeding Development ofDigitalPills, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 147, 148 (2016).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
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technology. 4' This part discusses the advancement of the MedTech industry,
including the evolution of JoMT, and explores the drivers and risks associated
with using connected medical devices.
A.

What's in a Name?: Understanding and Defining the Internet of
Medical Things

In the past five years, the MedTech industry has experienced exponential
growth, fueled primarily by a corresponding advancement in the Internet of
Things. 42 As the name suggests, JoT represents a network of smart devices
that collect and exchange personal data over the Internet. 43 While no

universally accepted definition for JoT exists, the term refers to the general
interaction between computers, sensors, and objects to collect and transfer
information through a wireless data infrastructure.4 4 These devices "operate
on embedded sensors that automatically measure and transfer data (i.e.,
environmental and activity information) over a network to data stores without
human interaction." 45 Breaking this down, JoT devices function in three
stages.4

First, JoT devices are embedded with radio-frequency identification
(RFID) sensors, which use radio waves to identify people and objects. 4 7 These

embedded sensors enable JoT devices to detect and gather data from their
hosts and surrounding environment, including the individuals who operate the
devices. 48 Next, the JoT device transmits this data through WiFi, Bluetooth,

mobile phone networks, or the Internet, where the data is stored using cloudbased applications. 49 Finally, end-users sift through the "massive troves of

Id.
Charlotte A. Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurityfor the DigitalHealth Marketplace,
26 ANNALS HEALTH L., Winter 2017, at 1, 1.
43. Leta E. Gonnan, The Era of the Internet of Things: Can ProductLiabilityLaws Keep
Up?, 84 DEF. COUNS. J. 1, 1 (2017).
44. See id. at 1-2; Davenport, supra note 12, at 261; see also Alan M. Winchester
Jaime L. Regan, Attacking Justiciability of Cybersecurity Claims in the Product Liability
Context, DEFENSE, Nov. 2015, at 84, 87 (2015) (discussing the definition of loT).
45. Gorman, supra note 43, at 1-2; see also Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the Gold
Rush: The Boom of the Internet of Things, and the Busts of Data-Security and Privacy, 28
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 75 (2017) (explaining the collection of
data).
46. See Paez & LaMarca, supra note 5, at 31; Posadas, supra note 45, at 76-77.
47. See Posadas, supra note 45, at 76-77; Frequently Asked Questions, RFID J.,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/site/faqs#Anchor-What-363 [https://perma.cc/T4J2-TSYG].
48. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 31; Posadas, supra note 45, at 76-77.
49. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 31; Posadas, supra note 45, at 76.
&

41.
42.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss1/4
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data" collected from these devices. 0 This data is analyzed for insights, trends,
and intelligence that can guide future decision-making and increase
'

productivity, safety, and efficiency. 5
In the healthcare industry, JoT operates by creating a network of medical
devices that connect to healthcare information technology (IT) systems. 5 2
Known as loMT, this network uses technology to enhance information and
data flow between patients and physicians.53 The most obvious examples of
loMT involve connected medical devices that are used to track patient
progress and manage chronic illness." These well-known devices include
pacemakers, blood pressure monitors, intravenous fluid pumps, defibrillators,
ingestible pill cameras, blood glucose monitors, imaging and scanning
equipment, and electrocardiogram devices." While JoT is relatively new to
the healthcare context, it has been described recently as "perneat[ing] nearly
every sector of the healthcare industry.""
B.

EncouragingInnovation: loMT Benefits

The benefits of loMT in the healthcare sector are promising and are a
major factor driving increased adoption of connected medical technology. 1
These benefits fall into three broad categories: (1) remote monitoring and
telehealth; (2) behavioral modification and patient outcomes; and (3)
administrative efficiency.' First, loMT benefits patients and providers by
transforming the landscape of telemedicine and enabling remote monitoring. 59
Remote monitoring allows providers to establish a constant connection with
patients anywhere in the world, which assists with monitoring acute and

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Knapton,

Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 31.
Id.
See FLORIN, supra note 3, at 8; Segura et al., supra note 23; Shah, supra note 4.
See Segura et al., supra note 23.
See id.
Id.; see Paez & LaMarca, supra note 5, at 31-33; Gorman, supra note 43, at7; Sarah
Terrorists Could Hack Pacemakers Like In Homeland, Say Security Experts,
TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
6,
2014),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/sciencenews/I 1212777/Terrorists-could-hack-pacemakers-like-in-Homeland-say-security-experts.ht
ml [https://penna.cc/N4JY-LL76].
56. Segura et al., supra note 23; see also Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 29 (supporting
the emergence of loT).
57. See Segura et al., supra note 23.
58. See id.
59.

See id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY

IN A CONNECTED WORLD

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
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chronic conditions. 60 Platforms such as e-mail, video conferencing, texting,
and patient portals enable health care to transcend the physical bounds of the
provider's office and provide care to patients when it is most convenient and
necessary.61

Second, loMT encourages behavioral modifications for patients,
particularly those with chronic illnesses, and has the potential to improve
patient outcomes. 62 With connected devices, patients can manage their

medical conditions at home, and have data transmitted to their providers
automatically. 63 This offers patients a sense of responsibility and
accountability for their health, and provides an incentive to take medication
and perform necessary testing.6 4 For example, ingestible pill sensors are being
developed that notify healthcare providers when medication is taken.6 ' Given
that more than 20% of prescriptions are never filled, a doctor may refuse to
order medication refills or increase medication dosages if she learns that a
patient is not taking her medication consistently.66 Patients, therefore, have
more motivation to follow their medical plans when their activities will be
reported to their healthcare providers. 6 7
Finally, loMT enhances administrative efficiency and operations.68
Numerous medical tasks may be automated, and patient data can be gathered
from various sources, even when the patient is not present in the doctor's

60. See Segura et al., supra note 23; see FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 59, at 7.
61. See Gorman, supra note 43, at 2 (noting the decreased need of human interaction);
Segura et al., supra note 23 ("As the loMT streamlines telemedicine, the physical office is
becoming less critical for routine appointments, because patients can now communicate with
their doctors via phone and video conference, as well as get prescription orders re-filled all
without leaving their homes, and at reduced cost.").
62. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 59, at 2, 7-8.
63. Id. at 7 ("For example, insulin pumps and blood-pressure cuffs that connect to a
mobile app can enable people to record, track, and monitor their own vital signs, without having
to go to a doctor's office.").
64. See, e.g., Hendrik Sybrandy, Doctors Hope New Digital Pill Will Encourage
Medication Adherence, CGTN: AMERICA (Aug. 5, 2018), https://america.cgtn.com/2018/

08/05/doctors-hope-new-digital-pill-will-encourage-medication-adherence
TT3N-3CYR].

[https://penna.cc/

65. See id.
66. See id.; Andrea B. Neiman et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Improving Medication
Adherence for Chronic Disease Management-Innovations and Opportunities, 66 CDC
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1241, 1248 (2017).
67. See Sybrandy, supra note 64.
68. See FLORIN, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that loT can "improve performance and

reduce inefficiencies in numerous sectors").
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69

Connected medical devices may run more efficiently and offer
increased reliability with the potential to identify errors and mistakes more
quickly than human providers. 70 In some instances, connected medical
devices may even be able to warn providers of potential failure indicators
before they occur. 7 ' Moreover, IoMT can encourage the development of
innovative services and more efficient use of organization infrastructure.72
For example, a hospital in Orlando, Florida used IoMT to develop a real-time
office.

location system in which family members can track the progress of a loved
one undergoing surgery. 73 Similarly, a separate hospital in Waterbury,
Connecticut used IoMT to analyze workflow trends with the goal of
identifying staffing needs for each shift.74 Use of JoT data saved the hospital
$650,000 in just six months by reducing unnecessary overtime.7 5 Thus, IoMT
may be used by patients and healthcare providers to streamline and enhance
healthcare delivery.
C.

The Flip Side ofProgress:JoMT Vulnerabilities

While IoMT has the potential to revolutionize patient care, the heightened
connectivity of medical devices raises questions regarding patient security,
network and data privacy, long-term maintenance, and device resilience. 76 In
its 2014 NSTAC Report to the President on the Internet of Things, the
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
explained that the risks accompanying IoMT devices include "new attack
vectors, new vulnerabilities, and perhaps most concerning of all, a vastly
7
increased ability to use remote access to cause physical destruction." 7
Although this list is not exhaustive, it highlights three areas of vulnerability

69.

See Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 34; FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 59, at

7-8.
70. PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., supranote 12, at 5.
71. Id.
72. Id. at ES-1; see Shah, supra note 4 ("Health care organizations often pursue loT
efforts to find novel ways to engage patients, monitor health status, derive insights from clinical
data, and advance care management and population health.").
73. Segura et al., supra note 23.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See SANDRA BURMEIER ET AL., SwISS RE SONAR-NEW EMERGING RISK INSIGHTS
11 (Urs Leimbacher et al. eds., 2015); see also PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM.
ADVISORY COMM., supranote 12, at ES-1 (noting additional possible risks).
77. PRESIDENT'SNAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 12, at ES-1.
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that warrant discussion: (1) personal privacy and security; (2) network privacy
and security; and (3) safety risks.78

First, JoMT presents an inherent risk of data breach that can expose
sensitive user information. 79 Of particular concern is that many JoMT devices
connect over unsecure networks, or networks with weak password
protections. 0 Wireless transmission of data through these channels creates
access points for hackers to compromise device security and privacy. 8 When
such a device is compromised, sensitive patient health data may be shared
publicly, resulting in a violation of individual privacy. 82 Given that healthcare
data is highly coveted on the black market-medical records alone are 20 to
50 times more valuable than financial data-there is no shortage of bad actors
attempting to hack unsecure medical devices. 83 Further, as discussed in Part
III, numerous JoMT device manufacturers may fall outside the confines of
federal regulation, which can disincentivize adoption of secure technology. 84
Consumers may not recognize the inherent risks associated with JoMT device
use, believing their health data to be secure in the cloud. 85
Second, JoMT exponentially expands the attack surface from which
unauthorized users can gain entry into broader medical networks."' Each
JoMT device that a healthcare operator places on its IT network has the
potential to serve as a backdoor entry point into the entire healthcare system. 87
The mere presence of JoMT devices in a healthcare setting weakens the
overall security of the network and creates access points that must be
monitored by IT professionals." Any unlawful hack or breach of an JoMT

78. See

FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 59, at 10.
79. Gorman, supra note 43, at 3; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 37-40.
80. See O'Brien, supra note 10; Kathryn R. Coburn, The Internet of Medical Things:
Scientific and Technical InnovationsPredict, Preempt, and TreatDisease, SCITECH L., Spring
2016, at 18, 19 (2016) ("Data inthe loMT is not secure."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra
note 59, at 12 (discussing the exploitation of vulnerabilities in devices).
81. Coburn, supra note 80, at 19; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 46.
82. Gorman, supra note 43, at 3; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 39.
83. Clemens Scott Kruse et al., Cybersecurity in Healthcare: A Systematic Review of
Modern Threats and Trends, TECH. & HEALTH CARE, Aug. 19, 2016, at 1, 6; Tschider, supra
note 42, at 8.
84. See Ashton, supra note 28, at 834; Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 240.
85. See Ashton, supra note 28, at 834 ("[T]he average consumer tends to undervalue the
security of Internet-based products.").
86. FLORIN, supra note 3, at 18; PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY
COMM., supra note 12, at 6.
87. Cf PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 12, at 1
(discussing the growing threat caused by the expansion of interconnected loT devices).
88. See id. at 6, 12.
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device has the potential to not only expose the sensitive health data of its user
but also the data of other patients stored on the broader healthcare network.89
Hackers can even negatively impact organizational operations by encrypting
patient and administrative data and demanding a ransom for the encryption
key. 90 Without access to its data, a healthcare organization cannot function
efficiently, and cannot confirm patient treatment plans.91
Finally, because JoMT operates as a portal between cyberspace and
humans, it has the potential to inflict bodily harm or death that may not be
present with other JoT applications. 92 As showcased in a 2012 episode of
Homeland, implantable loMT devices may be hacked to cause the device to
purposefully malfunction. 93 Former Vice President Dick Cheney had the
remote capabilities for his pacemaker disabled after research identified
vulnerabilities that could enable hackers to cause heart attacks remotely. 94
Similarly, researchers and white hat hackers have showcased their ability to
hack insulin pumps from a remote location and alter the device's settings to
either deny delivery of medicine completely, or provide excessive insulin. 9
In 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigations even warned hospitals to
discontinue using certain infusion pumps designed with a security flaw that
could allow an unauthorized user to alter medication dosages remotely. 96
Therefore, unlike other technologies, loMT creates the possibility for
significant human harm if a device is hacked or malfunctions. 97 These risks
cannot be ignored when evaluating device security.

89. See

FLORIN, supra note 3, at 18.
90. Charlie Osborne, U.S. Hospital Pays $55, 000 to Hackers after Ransomware Attack,
ZDNET
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-hospital-pays-55000-toransomware-operators/ [https://penna.cc/KYN7-42FK].
91. See id.
92. FLORIN, supra note 3, at 5; see Gorman, supra note 43, at 3; Paez & La Marca, supra
note 5, at 48 ("[A] breach of an loT object can also result in significant bodily harm."); Peppet,
supra note 38, at 134 ("[I]nsulin pumps have been shown to be vulnerable to hacking."). See
generally Detsch, supra note 22 (referencing the risks of injury from loT).
93. Andrea Peterson, Yes, TerroristsCould Have Hacked Dick Cheney 's Heart, WASH.
POST: THE SWITCH (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2013/10/21/yes-terrorists-could-have-hacked-dick-cheneys-heart/?utm tenn-.bfl506f843d8
[https://perna.cc/N59Z-96KB].
94. Id.; see Trevor Weyland, MedicalDevice Cybersecurity,GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE:
INDUSTRY INSIGHTS BLOG (May 19, 2016),
https://www.gallaghennalpractice.com/
blog/post/medical-device-cybersecurity [https://perna.cc/B7VY-TUPV] ("In 2015, students at
the University of Alabama hacked the pacemaker implanted in an iStan (a robotic dummy patient
used to train medical students) and were able to speed up its heart rate.").
95. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 48, supra note 59, at 12; Weyland, supra note 94.
96. Weyland, supra note 94.
97. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 48.
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III. THE NEED TO INCENTIVIZE SAFER CODING FOR IoMT DEVICES

Despite the serious risks accompanying JoMT, the industry has
experienced impressive and sustained growth that far outpaces the federal
legislature's adoption of safety and security regulations. 98 Existing laws and
regulations do not sufficiently capture and mitigate the risks associated with
digital technology, and require substantial updates to eliminate gaps in their
applicability and coverage. 99 Indeed, due to the healthcare industry's slow
adoption of MedTech at the beginning, 00 cybersecurity infrastructure and
corresponding regulatory frameworks for JoMT are only in the nascent
stages.' 0' Further, JoMT manufacturers are not emphasizing safe coding
practices, focusing instead on a "race to market" strategy that may result in
unsafe consumer products.1 02 This part explains the need to incentivize safer
coding in JoMT devices, with particular emphasis on: (1) the regulatory gaps
that enable JoMT device manufacturers to operate outside the bounds of
regulatory authority; and (2) the economic realities of device creation that
prioritize the "race to the market." Specifically, Part III explains why existing
privacy and security standards are insufficient to comprehensively regulate
the JoMT sector and clarify liability structures. Although state regulations also
exist on this topic, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
A.

Regulatory Gaps: Evaluating the Roles ofHHS and FDA

MedTech in the United States does not operate in a wholly unregulated
environment.1 03 Rather, the United States has implemented a patchwork and
sector-based framework to govern privacy and security throughout the
nation.' 0 4 In the healthcare industry, this regulatory authority is vested
primarily with two government agencies: Department of Health and Human
0
Services and Food and Drug Administration.o'
HHS's Office for Civil Rights

98.

See BROWN ET AL., supra note 24, at 10.
CHURI ET AL., supra note 13, at 4.
100. See HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON IMPROVING
CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 9 (2017),
101. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 2-4; Dave Fornell, Raising the Barfor MedicalDevice
Cyber Security, DAIC: CYBERSECURITY (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.dicardiology.com/articl
99.

&

e/raising-bar-medical-device-cyber-security [https://perna.cc/NU2L-FAJY].
102. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 2-4.
103. See Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 240.
104. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 40.
105. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights, HIPAA for Professionals,U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html
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(OCR) is the primary regulator of privacy and security in the healthcare sector,
while FDA's jurisdiction extends to the safety and efficacy of medical
devices. 0 6 Although the reach of both government agencies may encompass
certain JoMT devices and their developers, significant gaps exist in the
established regulatory frameworks such that portions of the JoMT industry
remain unregulated, with no mandatory privacy and security standards. 0 7
1.

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act:
Applicability, Scope, and Gaps

Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) in 1996 to ensure motility of health insurance coverage and reduce
costs associated with healthcare delivery. 08 Although HIPAA's goals did not
originally encompass privacy and security, such protections were later
mandated as healthcare organizations transitioned to electronic health records
and digital systems to reduce costs of care and administrative burdens.1 09 As
a result, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules govern the healthcare
landscape for privacy and security issues. ii0
The scope of HIPAA, however, is intentionally limited. HIPAA applies
only to "covered entities" and only protects a subset of health information

[https://perma.cc/KZF6-EE7T]; Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
fda.gov/Medicaldevices/default.htm
[https://penna.cc/F6TB-AFR5]. The Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") is another agency responsible for consumer protection and the elimination
of anti-competitive behaviors. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE:
2017 1 (2017). The FTC is not specific to health care, and its regulatory authority extends
primarily to unfair and deceptive acts or practices. See id. FTC's authority is not directed to
preventing or regulating privacy and security standards in the healthcare industry, and the FTC
does not create cybersecurity standards. See Kirk J. Nahra & Bethany A. Corbin, DigitalHealth
Regulatory Gaps in the United States, 4 COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE J. 21, 30 (2018). As a result,

the FTC "does not address legislative gaps that may leave digital health technology
unregulated." Id.
106. See Office for Civil Rights, About Us (OCR), U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
Consumers
[https://penna.cc/F5CK-6U2Q];
https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html
(Medical Devices), U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/resources-you-medical-devices/consumers-medical-devices
[https://perma.cc/2E4UR6HQ].
107. See Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 240.
108. HIPAA Privacy and Security for Beginners, WLEY REIN: NEWSLS. (July 2014),
https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-5029.html [https://perma.cc/8XBHNZXC] [hereinafter HIPAA for Beginners].
109. Id.
110. See id.
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"

known as "protected health information.""' To qualify as a covered entity,112
an organization must fall into one of three categories that are statutorily
defined: (1) healthcare provider;" 3 (2) health plan;"' or (3) healthcare
clearinghouse." In 2009, the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act expanded HIPAA's provisions to
encompass "business associates," which include any person or organization
that performs certain specified functions on behalf of a covered entity." 6
Regardless of the type of covered entity involved, HIPAA's coverage only
extends to protected health information (PHI), which is individually
identifiable health information transmitted in any form or medium.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule works by setting limitations on a covered
entity's or business associate's use or disclosure of PHI." 8 The basic
principle, subject to certain exceptions, is that a covered entity may not use or
disclose PHI except as the Privacy Rule permits or requires, or as the
individual (whose PHI is at issue) authorizes in writing.119 The HIPAA
Security Rule, in turn, complements the HIPAA Privacy Rule by
operationalizing the Privacy Rule's protections through implementation of
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for a subset of PHIelectronic PHI (ePHI).1 20 The Security Rule focuses on guarding against
unauthorized access to a patient's ePHI and represents the first set of widely
accepted security standards for healthcare practitioners.121
While HIPAA appears to offer comprehensive privacy and security
frameworks for the healthcare industry, significant gaps are revealed by
applying these regulations to digital health technology.1 22 First, as explained

111. Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 240.
112. See id.

113. A healthcare provider is any individual or organization that gets paid to provide health
care and transmits health information in electronic form. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018).
114. A health plan is an individual or group that pays the cost of medical care. Id.
115. A healthcare clearinghouse consists of entities that process information so it can be
transmitted in standard format between covered entities. Id.
116. See id. § 160.103; HIPAA for Beginners, supra note 108.
117. § 160.103; HIPAA for Beginners, supra note 108.
118. HIPAA for Beginners, supra note 108.
119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).

120. Id. § 164.302.
121. Id.
122. See DHHS, EXAMINING

OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY & SECURITY OF HEALTH
DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY HIPAA 20 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford et

al., When ToastersAttack: A PolycentricApproach to Enhancingthe "Security of Things," 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 448-49; Kirk Nahra, What Closing the HIPAA Gaps Means for the Future
of
Healthcare
Privacy,
HITECH
ANSWERS
(Nov.
9,
2015),
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above, HIPAA's protections and requirements extend only to digital health
actors that are covered entities or business associates.1 23 This means that if an
organization does not qualify as a covered entity or business associate, it has
no obligation to comply with HIPAA's privacy and security requirements.1 24
For instance, companies that manufacture fitness trackers that collect basic
health data, such as weight, heart rate, and height are not subject to HIPAA's
regulations because they do not qualify as a healthcare provider, healthcare
plan, or healthcare clearinghouse.1 25 Rather, the company provides this
product directly to consumers without involving providers or insurers.1 26
Numerous MedTech companies, therefore, exist outside the bounds of the
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules because they are not covered entities or
business associates.1 27
Second, HIPAA's applicability is limited by the type of information it
protects.1 28 Extending only to PHI, HIPAA excludes categories of health
information that may be sensitive but not individually identifiable or directly
related to a person's physical or mental health.1 29 Healthcare data that does
not satisfy the definition of PHI may be collected, used, and disclosed by any
company without violating federal healthcare regulations. 3 0 For example, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that lead-contamination notices issued by the
Cincinnati Health Department could be disclosed even though they contained
blood test results because the child's name was not included in the
document.' 3 ' MedTech companies that gather or aggregate data that is not
personally identifiable are within their rights to sell or disclose such data under

https://www.hitechanswers.net/what-closing-the-hipaa-gaps-means-for-the-future-of-healthca
re-privacy-2/ [https://penna.cc/PJ56-JW5E].
123. Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 240; Montgomery, supra note 40, at 170
(examining the application of HIPAA to the Proteus digital pill and noting relevant statutory
gaps).
124. See Elizabeth Snell, How Do HIPAA Regulations Apply to Wearable Devices?,
HEALTHIT SECURITY (Mar. 23, 2017), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/how-do-hipaaregulations-apply-to-wearable-devices [https://penna.cc/6LEH-3QEQ].
125. See Nicolas P. Terry, Will the Internetof Things Transform Healthcare?,19 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 327, 342 (2016) ("HIPAA data protection seldom will apply to data generated
or stored on a mobile device, wearable, or loT node.").
126. See Snell, supra note 124.
127. Paez & Tobitsch, supra note 33, at 240.
128. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).
129. See id. § 164.502(a), (d).
130. See generally Terry, supra note 125, at 338, 342 (discussing coverage of electronic
medical apps under HIPAA).
131. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 ¶ 11 (Ohio 2006).
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HIPAA.' 32 Similarly, if the data MedTech companies collect does not directly
relate to a person's physical or mental health, and does not concern the
provision of healthcare services or payment for such services, then
individually identifiable health data may be disclosed, used, and sold. 33
As a result, HIPAA is limited in its applicability and contains regulatory
gaps that cause MedTech actors to fall outside its scope. 3 4 With minor
exceptions, most digital health companies today will not qualify as covered
entities or will collect data outside the scope of PHI, allowing them to remain
unregulated by federal privacy and security frameworks.' 35 When this occurs,
MedTech companies may operate with little to no federal oversight, and can
lack incentives to ensure adequate privacy and security standards are
upheld.' 3 6 Moreover, there is nothing in HIPAA that addresses liability for the
malfunctioning, hijacking, or hacking of a healthcare device. HIPAA even
precludes a private right of action for violations of its own provisions.1 37
HIPAA's focus is thus purely on establishing federal standards of care that
covered entities must satisfy, not remedying harm to consumers from device
vulnerabilities.1 38 Accordingly, HIPAA does not sufficiently regulate the
MedTech industry.
2.

FDA: Device and Cybersecurity Guidance

In contrast to the limited oversight of MedTech companies by HHS, FDA
plays a central role in the regulation of medical devices generally. FDA is
responsible for ensuring the safety and efficacy of certain classifications of
devices, though not all MedTech products will trigger FDA scrutiny. 139 The
type of oversight and pre-market approval that medical devices must

132. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a), (d).
133. See id.
134. PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 12, at 6;
Davenport, supra note 12, at 260.
135. See Terry, supra note 125, at 338-39, 342.
136. See id. at 343; DEAN, supra note 14, at 3-4; PRESIDENT'SNAT'L SEC. TELECOMM.
ADVISORY COMM., supra note 12, at 6.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2009); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Infornation, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462-01, 82601 (Dec. 28, 2000); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d
569, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006); Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d
32, 45 (Conn. 2014).
138. See generally HIPAA for Beginners, supra note 108.
139. See New York Attorney GeneralAddresses Key Health Care Privacy Gaps, WILEY
REIN:
NEWSLS.
(Apr. 2017),
https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-

April_2017_PIF-NYAGAddresses Key Health Care PrivacyGaps.html [https://penna.cc/
DZ3Q-43KR].
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undertake depends principally on the device's classification, which is
determined by the level of risk posed by the device.' Class I devices pose
the least risk and are subject only to general controls.' 4 Class II devices,
which are slightly riskier, must satisfy general controls and special controls.1 42
Finally, Class III devices, which are used to support, or sustain human life or
pose an unreasonable risk of illness or injury, are the most heavily
regulated. 14

Recognizing the developing intersection of medical devices and
technology, FDA issued industry guidance titled PostmarketManagement of
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices on December 28, 2016. 144 This voluntary
guidance sets forth FDA's recommendations for effectively managing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities.'
FDA expressly recognizes that
medical devices may now be "networked" and connected with other medical
applications that comprise the loMT.' 4 6 The interconnected structure enables
the exploitation of vulnerabilities and "may represent a risk to health" such
that "continual maintenance throughout the product life cycle" is necessary to
protect "against such exploits."' 4 7 FDA thus recommends that medical device
manufacturers proactively address cybersecurity vulnerabilities to reduce
4
health and safety risks.'1
Importantly, FDA acknowledges that risk management for cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in medical devices "is a shared responsibility among
stakeholders including the medical device manufacturer, the user, the
Information Technology (IT) system integrator, Health IT developers, and an
array of IT vendors that provide products that are not regulated by the
FDA." 49 While FDA encourages collaboration among these actors to
enhance post-market cybersecurity, it cannot mandate cybersecurity
protections in devices that are already approved and marketed. 5 0 Thus,

140. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012).
141. Steve Kanovsky et al., Chapter 8: The Medical Device Approval Process, in A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA's FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 211, 213 (Kenneth R.

Pifia & Wayne L. Pines eds., 6th ed. 2017) [hereinafter FOOD & DRUG LAW GUIDE].
142. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2016); Kanovsky et al., supra note 141, at 213-14.
143. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2016); Kanovsky et al., supra note 141, at 213-14.
144. FDA, POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 1, 4 (2016)
[hereinafter FDA, POSTMARKET GUIDANCE].
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 6.
150. See id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
20

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 1

although FDA's guidance is a crucial step towards securing medical devices,
including JoMT products, its voluntary nature does not adequately incentivize
compliance.
Nearly two years later, FDA continues to recognize the overwhelming
importance of cybersecurity in medical devices. Recently, FDA issued draft
guidance regarding the Content ofPremarketSubmissionsfor Managementof
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices.'' FDA again reiterated "[t]he need for
effective cybersecurity to ensure medical device functionality and safety," and
noted that this objective has become increasingly important with the
continued use of wireless and network-connected devices, and the frequent
electronic exchange of patient data.' 5 2 As manufacturers design their medical
devices and apply for pre-market approval, FDA hopes that they will mitigate
cybersecurity risks.' 53 However, as with the post-market cybersecurity
guidance, the pre-market guidance is voluntary.1 54
While FDA has taken a proactive approach to encourage medical device
cybersecurity, additional measures-particularly those that involve
compliance incentives-must be adopted to protect patient safety.1 55
Moreover, although FDA regulates the approval of medical devices, it does
not provide relief for patients that are hanned by device malfunctions or
hacking.' 5 6 Although FDA's role is to regulate medical device safety and
security, it lacks authority and frameworks to create a comprehensive
mandatory cybersecurity system, and to apportion liability and remedies
accordingly. Combined with HIPAA, this creates a regulatory gap that has not
yet been resolved by the federal government.

151. FDA, CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2018).
152. Id. at 4.
153. See generally id. (presenting draft guidelines to strengthen medical devices against
cybersecurity threats).
154. See id. at 1, 5; Louiza Dudin, Note, Networked Medical Devices: Finding a
Legislative Solution to Guide Healthcare into the Future, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1085, 1093,

1098 (2017).
155. See generally Dudin, supra note 154, at 1093 (explaining that voluntary FDA
guidance does "not appear to provide a strong incentive for manufacturers to meet their duty of
care in ensuring the cybersecurity of their devices"). Dudin advised that the FDA should
"leverage its ability to increase oversight under its regulatory authority in order to ensure that
manufacturers comply with safety and security standards and address threats proactively rather
than reporting adverse events after the fact." Id. at 1098.
156. See id. at 1093 ("[D]evices approved for market by the FDA are shielded from
manufacturer liability claims.").
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Industry Cybersecurity Frameworks

To help address federal regulatory gaps for the security of JoMT devices,
numerous industry organizations have published their own voluntary
cybersecurity frameworks that seek to illuminate best practice standards.'5 7
These frameworks are intended to enable digital health companies to adopt a
cybersecurity structure that best meets their organizational needs.' 8 A 2018
survey conducted by the Healthcare Information and Management Systems
Society 5 9 reported that there are five primary security frameworks in use by
healthcare organizations today: (1) National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST);1 6 0 (2) Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST);161
(3) Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical Security Controls;1 62 (4)
International Organization for Standardization (ISO);163 and (5) Control
Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT).1 64 The
framework established by NIST is the most well-recognized voluntary
cybersecurity structure today,1 65 and a cross-walk document exists
highlighting the interaction between the NIST cybersecurity standards and the
HIPAA Security Rule.1 66 NIST has further proposed guidance for JoT devices

157. See infra notes 153-56.
158. See Tara Swaminatha, The Rise of the NIST CybersecurityFramework, CSO (May
11, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3271139/data-protection/the-rise-of-the-nistcybersecurity-framework.html [https://penna.cc/L3A7-XSYA].
159. HIMSS N. AM., 2018 HIMSS CYBERSECURITY SURVEY 18 (2018).

160. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY VERSION 1.1 (2018).
161. HITRUST, INTRODUCTION TO THE HITRUST CSF, VERSION 9.1 (2018).
162. CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC., CIS CONTROLS, VERSION 7 (2018).
163. JOINT TECH. Comm. ISO/EC JTC 1, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC
27001 (2013).

164. IT

GOVERNANCE

INST.,

CONTROL

OBJECTIVES FOR

INFORMATION

AND

4.1 (2007).
165. See Scott Schlimmer, Implementing the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Could Be
Worth
at
Least
$1.4m
to
Your
Business,
CSO
(Apr.
19,
2018),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3268937/implementing-the-nist-cybersecurity-frameworkcould-be-worth-at-least-1-4m-to-your-business.html [https://penna.cc/BN4X-SQT4].
166. DHHS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, HIPAA SECURITY RULE CROSSWALK TO NIST
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (2016).
RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
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in the form of a white paper on October 17, 2018,167 and is in the process of
creating a privacy framework for 2019.168
The current industry cybersecurity frameworks represent a collective
effort to define best-practice standards in a constantly evolving technological
environment without stifling innovation.1 69 The frameworks incorporate
flexibility to match organizational structure, yet they provide the benefit of
shared expert experience among myriad organizational groups and industry
actors. 170 This cooperative approach to cybersecurity enhances overall device
safety and organizational response to security incidents by aggregating
experience and ideas. 171 Thus, these cybersecurity models possess extreme
merit, particularly in the face of legislative gaps.
While industry cybersecurity frameworks are crucial to bridging the gaps
for JoMT device security, they suffer from the same drawbacks as FDA's
medical device cybersecurity guidance: the standards are purely voluntary.1 72
Presently, there is no way to enforce these standards to hold manufacturers of
JoMT products accountable for unsafe coding or lax device security. If an
JoMT device manufacturer elects not to follow a voluntary cybersecurity
framework, it faces little consequences and, depending on the company, may
remain unregulated by federal and industry actors.1 73 Such a result does not
encourage heightened device safety standards, but instead enforces the status
quo. Thus, existing federal and industry cybersecurity standards-while a
promising step in the right direction-do not create a comprehensive security
structure for JoMT devices, and fail to address liability and relief for patients
who suffer harm from breached or hijacked JoMT devices.

167. See JEFFREY VOAS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH, NIST
CYBERSECURITY WHITE PAPER: INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) TRUST CONCERNS, at i-ii (draft

2018); see also Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 51 (explaining that in September 2015, NIST
published a draft loT framework called the Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems, which
sought to create a shared understanding of Cyber-Physical Systems).
168. See

Privacy

Framework,

NAT'L

INST.

OF

STANDARDS

&

TECH.,

https://www.nist.gov/privacy-framework [https://penna.cc/3HFC-GX8A].
169. See generally NIST Releases Second Draft to Cybersecurity Framework, ANSI
Encourages Stakeholders to Comment, AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. (Dec. 8, 2017),

https://www.ansi.org/newspublications/news_story?menuid=7&articleid=cde5f62c-3ee2-414
6-9753-9e6eOddaff9f [https://perna.cc/5CWN-GHFL] (explaining that the NIST framework
was created through collaboration between industry and government).
170. Swaminatha, supra note 158.
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 160, at v.
173. See PRESIDENT'S NAT'L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 12, at 6.
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C. Economic Realities and the "Race to Market"
In addition to voluntary cybersecurity frameworks and regulatory gaps
that permit JoMT developers to evade government oversight, economic
realities for device creation unintentionally foster a "race to the market"
mindset that prioritizes speed over safety.'" Scholars note that the absence of
effective cybersecurity measures is attributable, in part, to "weak economic
incentives," and that these weak incentives and market failures "have led to
an accumulation of insecure hardware and software.""' While creating secure
code can potentially result in a marketing advantage or impact brand
reputation,' 7 6 it is extremely difficult for consumers to compare product
security.' 7 7 Such benefits, therefore, may go unnoticed, causing
manufacturers to lose money without seeing a sufficient return on their
investment.'17
Indeed, a 2017 study by the Ponemon Institute underscores the need for
manufacturers to consider consumer safety and cybersecurity when
developing JoMT devices.1 79 Sixty-seven percent of medical device
manufacturers surveyed in the Ponemon study believed that a cyberattack on
one or more medical devices built by their organization is likely, yet only 17%
of these manufacturers have taken any substantial steps to prevent such an
attack. iso Only one-third of medical device manufacturers encrypt traffic
among JoT devices, and 53% of these manufacturers acknowledge that "there
is a lack of quality assurance and testing procedures that lead to vulnerabilities
in medical devices."'" Further, despite the fact that 3 1% of medical device
developers are aware of actual attacks involving connected medical devices,
only 25% of these developers have added security protocols or architecture
inside the devices to protect patients and clinicians. 182

174. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 14, at 3-4.
175. Id.; see Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 52-53 ("loT manufacturers often lack an
economic incentive to provide software updates and support. . . ."); Daley, supra note 31, at 535
("[T]he economic and legal structure of the software development industry leaves no single
entity with strong enough incentives to secure software before it is shipped.").
176. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 3-4.
177. Daley, supra note 31, at 537-38. "[T]he vast majority of consumers lack the expertise
to effectively evaluate security features. Consumers therefore lack the ability to effectively
compare security across competitors." Id.
178. See id. DEAN, supra note 14, at 3-4.
179. See PONEMON INST., MEDICAL DEVICE SECURITY: AN INDUSTRY UNDER
ATTACK AND UNPREPARED TO DEFEND

4 (2017).

180. Id. at 1.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id. at 1-2.
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Device manufacturers additionally note that few connected medical
devices are actually tested in the design phase.' 83 Only 28% of medical device
respondents affirmed that testing is done prior to development and postrelease, and only 9% of manufacturers test their deployed medical devices
annually."' This lack of testing is explained, in part, by the pressure device
manufacturers face to market connected devices quickly. 85 Where rushing
devices to the market is a priority, software security becomes an unfortunate
afterthought.' Moreover, just 51% of device manufacturers follow the
existing voluntary cybersecurity framework, best practice security
framework, or both.'8 7 Thus, current "[m]edical device security practices in
place are not the most effective,""" and "[a]ccountability for the security of
medical devices manufactured or used is lacking."'8 9 It is time to incentivize
safer JoMT development, particularly given the life or death risks these
devices can pose.
IV. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY STRUCTURE
Given the voluntary cybersecurity frameworks in existence today, the
"race to market" reality, and the regulatory gaps that permit JoMT developers
to evade government oversight, it is necessary that legislatures provide
sufficient incentives for manufacturers to create safe and secure code for
JoMT products.1 90 While numerous bills have been proposed at the federal
and state levels regarding regulation of JoMT products, these bills have a low
probability of passage and have been met with fierce opposition by JoMT
manufacturers.191 These manufacturers claim that such legislation will not
only drive developers out of the field, but will also hinder progress in the

183. Id. at 14.

184. Id. at 2, 14.
185. Id. at 2.

186. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 53.
187. See PONEMON INST., supra note 179, at 3. Sixty-two percent of device manufacturers
also do not follow a published Secure Development Life Cycle process for medical devices. Id.
at 14.
188. Id. at 8.
189. Id. at 2.
190. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 8-11; Daley, supra note 31, at 538; Lemos, supra note
18.
191. See Daley, supra note 31, at 542; Evans, supra note 17; Rosenzweig, supra note 19;
see, e.g., Bethany Corbin & Megan Brown, PartnershipsCan Enhance Security in Connected

Health and Beyond, CIRCLEID (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20171213
jpartnerships can enhance securityin connected health and beyond/[https://penna.cc/9SA
T-5766].
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IoMT industry because these legislative proposals cannot be quickly and
efficiently amended to keep pace with technological progress.1 92 In fact, by
the time many JoMT bills are passed, they will be outdated due to the rapid
advances in technology that can occur over a short period of time.1 93 Thus,
JoMT has proven difficult for state and federal legislatures to regulate, and
this lack of mandatory regulation has created a dearth of incentives for JoMT
manufacturers to develop secure JoMT products.1 94
Provided this current state of affairs, a comprehensive JoMT liability
model would offer critical incentives to manufacturers to increase the security
of their products and comply with voluntary cybersecurity best practice
standards. As is, there are limited incentives to encourage manufacturers to
expend time, resources, and money on developing safer products when they
are not subject to regulatory oversight and do not have a clear grasp on the
potential liability they could face for unsecure code. 195 Part IV explains why
current liability frameworks are ill suited to the JoMT context and advocates
for the development of a comprehensive liability structure as the "stick" that
encourages incentivizing safer code.
A.

Existing Liability Standards: Evaluatingthe Application ofProducts
Liability to JoMT

Pursuant to traditional tort doctrines, device malfunctions are typically
addressed through products liability laws at the state level (when preemption
is not implicated).1 96 Products liability refers to the liability of a manufacturer,
processor, or seller whose goods injure consumers.1 97 Three legal paths may
be pursued under the products liability framework: (1) strict liability; (2)

192. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 24; Ashton, supra note 28, at 834; Evans, supra note
17.
193. Jonathan D. Klein, 2017: The Year of Big Shifts in Cybersecurity, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (May 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almlD/12027877
93676/?slreturn=20191011051937 [https://penna.cc/N3RC-PYDD].
194. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 4; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 52-53; Klein, supra
note 193.
195. See generally DEAN, supra note 14, at 4 (explaining the reasons for medical devices
lacking security); Gorman, supra note 43.
196. See Gorman, supra note 43, at 4. While products liability claims for medical devices
may be preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and subsequent amendments,
preemption is beyond the scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that
preemption does not bar state products liability claims.
197. DEAN, supra note 14, at 9; Gorman, supra note 43; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5,
at 57.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
26

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 1

negligence; and (3) breach of warranty.' 98 The application of these doctrines
to loMT, however, is akin to fitting a square peg in a round hole.' 99 As loMT
progresses, "it could reshape the law of products liability by redefining who
can be held at fault and who will bear the financial consequences if something
were to go wrong with a product." 200 This section explains the fundamentals
of products liability and details why this tort doctrine, as currently structured,
is ill-fitted to remedy harm from loMT devices.
1.

Strict ProductsLiability

First, strict products liability is used to combat harm caused by
unreasonably dangerous products. 201 This doctrine is applicable to products
that cause substantial harm, death, or property damage due to defects. 202 The
purpose of strict products liability is to ensure that the manufacturers,
developers, and sellers of defective devices bear the costs of any harm a
consumer experiences due to that product. 203 In contrast to other tort
doctrines, such as negligence, strict products liability does not require prior
knowledge of a risk as a prerequisite to liability. 204 Rather, liability is
automatic when it is proven that a device is defective, regardless of whether
the manufacturer exercised all possible care when developing the product.205
In this manner, strict liability is intended to incentivize manufacturers to
"weigh the potentially small cost of mitigating the defective design or
manufacturing element in their product against releasing the product with
defects and having to cover potentially large damages that these defects may
cause." 206
While defective digital products are not new, strict products liability has
only been applied in rare instances. 207 Its limited application is due to three

198. DEAN, supra note 14, at 9; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 57.
199. See, e.g., Liability andIoT Devices A Legal Can of Worms, DATA FOUNDRY BLOG
(May 15, 2018), https://www.datafoundry.com/blog/liability-loT-devices-legal-can-of-worms
[https://penna.cc/239C-8WTJ]. Determining the liability for loT devices "will be more difficult
than ever" because "the diversity of the loT field has turned the typical regulatory landscape on
its head." Id.
200. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 57.
201. DEAN, supra note 14, at 10.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 57.
206. DEAN, supra note 14, at 10.
207. Id. at 16.
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primary factors. First, the economic loss doctrine limits the type of damages
that can be remedied through strict products liability. 208 As previously noted,
strict products liability requires a demonstration of physical harm, death, or
property damage that is directly attributable to the defective device.209 The
economic loss doctrine precludes claims based solely on financial losses,
which are often the kind of impacts that insecure digital products have
produced in the past. 210 JoMT, however, has the potential to skirt this
economic loss limitation because its interconnectivity may result in physical
harm or death, depending on the nature of the hack, breach, or hijack. 211 As
digital technologies become increasingly integrated with devices, "the
potential for physical harm may grow." 212 Thus, while the economic loss
doctrine has traditionally barred strict products liability for digital devices, it
213
is less of a concern for loMT.
Second, and more importantly, consumers face an uphill battle trying to
prove that "missing security features or digital defects alone led to harm or
damage," and most consumers do not have an "empirically-based cost-benefit
calculation with supporting probabilities for claims." 214 Similarly, third-party
interference with the device by hackers may constitute an intervening event
that absolves the manufacturer of liability (though it may have been the
manufacturer's insecure code that enabled the hacker to access the device in
the first place). 215 Finally, ambiguity exists regarding whether software is a
product or a service. 216 Products liability applies only to products, and in some
U.S. states, software or code may be viewed as an intangible item. 217 Given
the variability in products liability standards throughout the United States, it
is possible that some jurisdictions may find strict products liability
inapplicable to insecure code. 218 Thus, strict products liability may not
provide a sufficient remedy for consumers despite the risk of harm presented
by insecure JoMT code.

208. See Beery & Burns, supra note 20, at 55; see also Butler, supra note 21, at 919-21
(discussing the impact of the economic loss doctrine on loT devices).
209. DEAN, supra note 14, at 16.
210. Id.
211. See Butler, supra note 21, at 919-21; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 48.
212. DEAN, supra note 14, at 16.
213. See Butler, supra note 21, at 919-21.
214. DEAN, supra note 14, at 16.
215. See id. at 18.
216. Id. at 17; see also Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 58 (discussing whether software
should be considered a product or a service).
217. DEAN, supra note 14, at 17.
218. See id. at 16-18; see also Untangling the Web, supra note 4.
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The converse, however, also has the potential to be true. As JoMT
develops, there may be greater application of strict products liability to JoMT
devices in ways that were not originally intended.219 For example, given that
most JoMT products present a risk of death or bodily injury from device hacks
or hijacks, courts could conceivably apply the strict products liability doctrine
to all JoMT devices regardless of whether harm actually occurs. 220 The
problem with this approach is three-fold. First, because there is no universally
secure code, each JoMT device-regardless of whether it satisfies the strictest
security requirements to date-will still have the potentialto be hijacked and
create life-or-death scenarios. 221 This places JoMT device manufacturers at a
continuous risk for unfettered liability related to digital products, even if the
manufacturer took all reasonable steps and adhered to voluntary industry
frameworks. Such a risk for liability, in turn, may cause manufacturers to
abandon the JoT market, which will derail and stifle innovation in an industry
that promises to revolutionize health care.222
Moreover, it is still unclear where along the supply chain liability will fall
for a malfunctioning device. 223 JoMT differs from past technological

developments in that it has an extensive supply chain that involves numerous
manufacturers, developers, suppliers, coders, and sellers. 224 At this time, there
is no clear demarcation of liability along this chain. 225 "While contractual
arrangements might allow for the allocation of liability between parties," strict
liability cannot be transferred by contracts. 226 Companies would therefore
need to show which manufacturer or party was responsible for the defect,

219. DEAN, supra note 14, at 19.
220. See generally Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 46, 48, 59.
221. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 7 (expounding on the vast amount of errors that always
exist in code); Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 59; Wenzel, supra note 33, at 59 (stating that
there is no such thing as a computer that cannot be hacked); Beery & Bums, supra note 20, at
55 (noting that all complex software is understood to have bugs).
222. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 59-60; Evans, supra note 17; see also Daley,
supra note 31, at 542 (discussing that any liability borne by software vendors will extinguish the
current startup ecosystem).
223. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 12-13, 21; Untangling the Web, supra note 4.
224. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 30 ("[T]he loT ecosystem hinges on the
interconnectivity of countless devices and participants, companies will need to account for the
legal rights and obligations of multiple stakeholders involved throughout a product's entire
lifecycle, from design and manufacturing to installation, operation, maintenance and
decommissioning."); see also DEAN, supra note 14, at 12-13, 21; Untangling the Web, supra
note 4.
225. See, e.g., Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 60.
226. DEAN, supra note 14, at 21.
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which can be difficult to determine. 227 This will require the "development of
digital technology failure standards and thorough incident investigation,"
which is costly and may drive developers out of the market. 228
In short, the application of strict products liability in this manner will not
result in a proper balancing of consumer harm and manufacturer
responsibility. No clear guidelines exist for apportioning liability among an
JoMT supply chain, and the mere risk of unfettered strict products liability for
device manufacturers can inhibit fundamental innovation. 229 Thus, in its
current form, strict products liability cannot be easily applied to JoMT.
2.

Negligence

The second theory of liability potentially applicable to JoMT devices is
negligence. Proof of negligence requires demonstration of five factors: (1) a
duty or standard of care; (2) breach of that duty or standard of care; (3) cause
in fact; (4) proximate cause; and (5) damages. 23 0 Negligence in the context of
products liability can occur if a supplier, retailer, or manufacturer places an
JoMT product into the stream of commerce with inadequate labeling, or if
there are manufacturing or design defects. 231 The manufacturer or supplier
will be liable if it failed to exhibit ordinary care to a party who suffers injury
proximately caused by the manufacturer's negligent conduct.232 For products
liability, negligence can arise in numerous ways, including: design of the
product, selection of materials, production process, product assembly and
testing, and placement of inadequate warnings or directions. 233
One of the most common applications of negligence to products liability
occurs in the context of design defects. 23 4 A design defect claim alleges that
the manufacturer's product design was not reasonable in light of the product's
risk of harm and availability of safer alternative designs. 23 5 Accordingly, a
design defect claim requires proof of at least three elements: (1) the product

227. Id.
228. Id. at 3, 21.
229. See id. at 12-13, 21; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 60.
230. Lewison v. Renner, 905 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Neb. 2018) (citing Latzel v. Bartek, 846
N.W.2d 153 (Neb. 2014)).
231. See Scott, supra note 19, at 459.
232. See Lewison, 905 N.W.2d at 548 (explaining the general standards for prevailing in a
negligence action).
233. What Is ProductLiability Negligence?, ATTORNEYS.COM, http://www.attomeys.co
m/products-liability/negligence [https://perna.cc/9MCN-YCKF].
234. See id.
235. Scott, supra note 19, at 459.
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posed a substantial likelihood of harm; (2) a safer
alternative product or design existed; and (3) the product,
the plaintiffs injury. 23 6 In these cases, the factfinder
manufacturer's intent and judgment in selecting the

and more feasible
as designed, caused
must evaluate the
particular product

design.237 Some courts view this analysis in terms of risk versus utility. 23 8

With respect to JoMT, it is conceivable that plaintiffs could bring design
defect claims premised on insecure code. Specifically, a plaintiff may argue
that the manufacturer's design of an JoMT product is inherently risky due to
the manufacturer's selection of certain code, failure to use cybersecurity best
practice standards in testing the code prior to launch, or both. Plaintiffs,
however, will face numerous problems with such allegations. 23 9 First, there is
no universally secure code, and plaintiffs will have difficulty establishing that
the code and accompanying security processes selected by a manufacturer are
inherently less safe than other alternatives. 240 In fact, it is estimated that
"programmers make between 10 and 50 errors for every 1,000 lines of
code." 241 Second, negligent design defect claims are premised on the
existence and availability of a safer alternative product design.242 Absent a
safer alternative, negligence design claims can fail as a matter of law.243 Given
the rapidly evolving state of technology, it is possible that there may not be
alternative products on the market for which a plaintiff could compare the
manufacturer's product. Further, given the inherent flaws in software, it is
possible that any similar products that do exist on the market would not be
safer.
Third, plaintiffs may have difficulty establishing that the product posed a
substantial risk of harm .244 All implantable devices embedded with

236.
2018).
237.
238.
239.

See MICHAEL WEINBERGER, NEW YORK PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§

18:3 (2d ed.

Id.
See id.; Butler, supra note 21, at 927.
See Butler, supra note 21, at 915.

240. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 7; VINCENT J. VITKOWSKY, THE INTERNET OF
THINGS: A NEW ERA OF CYBER LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 15, 16 (2015); Paez & La

Marca, supra note 5, at 59; Wenzel, supra note 33, at 59; Beery & Burns, supra note 20, at 58;
Evans, supra note 17; Untangling the Web, supra note 4.
241. DEAN, supra note 14, at 7.
242. See, e.g., KAREN SCHULTZ & THEODORE Z. WYMAN, TEXAS JURISPRUDENCE
§ 34 (3d ed. 2018).
243. See Connally v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (S.D. Ala. 1999)
(quoting Beechv. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. 1991)).
244. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 21, at 915.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss1/4

30

Corbin: When "Things" Go Wrong: Redefining Liability for the Internet of
2019]

REDEFINING LIABILITY FOR THE INTERNET OF MEDICAL THINGS

31

connectivity mechanisms are likely to pose similar risks of harm, 245 and it will
be challenging to establish that one product is more or less risky than another
device that is similarly implanted into a patient's body. Further, the courts
would risk opening the litigation floodgates and driving manufacturers out of
the JoMT field if they were to find that any JoMT device implanted into a
patient's body poses a substantial likelihood of harm, given that there is no
defect-free code.246 Risk will exist with any JoMT device, and it is unclear at
this stage what levels of risk are and are not acceptable. 247
Moreover, to the extent a plaintiff attempted to apply general negligence
principles outside the design defect context, she would face substantial
difficulty establishing the existence of a duty of care. 248 As noted, negligence
is premised upon the violation of an established standard of care. 249 There are
no mandatory federal cybersecurity standards, however, for JoMT
products. 25 0 As evidenced in Part III, JoMT products regularly fall within the
cracks of federal legislation and sometimes are not subject to government
oversight.251 Additionally, federal agencies do not actively regulate
cybersecurity of JoMT devices at this stage-as evidenced by the voluntary
nature of the FDA's post-market cybersecurity guidance. 25 2 While industry
cybersecurity frameworks exist, they are also voluntary, and there is no
consensus on which cybersecurity framework should or must be adopted by
healthcare organizations. 253 Without readily discernable and established
standards in place, it is difficult to argue that these standards have been

245. See BURMEIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 11; Carmen Camara et al., Security and
Privacy Issues in Implantable MedicalDevices: A Comprehensive Survey, 55 J. BIOMEDICAL
INFORMATICS

272, 272 (2015).

246. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 59; see also Detsch, supra note 22 (discussing
faulty codes in loT devices that cause serious bodily harm or death).
247. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 7; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 52-53.
248. See VITKOWSKY, supra note 240, at 16; see also Beery & Bums, supra note 20, at
57-58 (explaining that it will be difficult to establish an accepted duty of care).
249. Lewison v. Renner, 905 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Neb. 2018) (citing Latzel v. Bartek, 846
N.W.2d 153 (Neb. 2018)).
250. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 43, at 4-5; Merritt Baer & Chinmayi Shanna, What
CybersecurityStandard Will a Judge Use in Equifax Breach Suits?, LAWFARE (Oct. 20, 2017,
7:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-cybersecurity-standard-will-judge-use-equifaxbreach-suits [https://perma.cc/AL27-BBV3].
251. See discussion supra PartIII.
252. See, e.g., FDA, POSTMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 144.
253. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 160, at v.
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breached.254 Thus, the negligence model may fail to provide sufficient relief
to injured consumers.
3.

Breach of Warranty

The final liability model that is routinely applied to device defects is
breach of warranty, including common law warranties and warranties under
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Unfortunately, the law
surrounding whether Article 2 applies to JoMT devices-which can
incorporate software, software-related services, and tangible goods-is
unclear. 255 JoMT has transformed interactions between buyers and sellers, and
created more elaborate hybrid transactions with increased levels of
complexity. 25 6 This complexity has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding
whether Article 2, which covers consumer goods, applies to hybrid
transactions. 25 7 This uncertainty "belies the UCC's stated goals of uniformity
and simplicity and can lead to unwarranted disputes between parties about the
laws applicable to a transaction." 258 Thus, whether Article 2 and its warranty
provisions apply to JoMT devices is in a state of flux, with such discussion
extending beyond the scope of this Article.
Difficulties also exist with applying common law warranties to JoMT
devices. Two types of common law warranties exist: (1) express warranties;
and (2) implied warranties. 25 9 With respect to express warranties-which are
explicit promises that devices will perform in a particular manner-it is
possible that JoMT device manufacturers may expressly guarantee their
products in limited contexts, but such a warranty is likely to only extend to
the device itself, and not to any software, product monitoring, or guarantees
against breaches, hacks, or hijacks. 260 Moreover, it is doubtful that any JoMT
manufacturer will warrant its product for secure software code, given the

254. See VITKOWSKY, supra note 240, at 16; see also Beery & Bums, supra note 20, at
57-58 (quoting VITKOWSKY, supra note 240, at 16).
255. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactionsandthe Internetof Things: Goods, Services, or
Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 77, 79-80, 87-88, 104 (2017).
256. Id. at 103.
257. See id. at 88-89, 103-04.
258. Id. at 89.
259. What are Express and Implied Warranties?, FINDLAw,
https://con
sumer.findlaw.com/consumer-transactions/what-are-express-and-implied-warranties.html
[https://perma.cc/JBN3 -PFYX].
260. Elvy, supra note 255, at 115; see also What are Express and Implied Warranties?,
supra note 259 (explaining in more detail how express warranties are different from implied
warranties).
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intrinsic "bugginess" that exists in code today.261 Indeed, software
manufacturers routinely evade liability for software vulnerabilities through
end-user agreements, which disclaim all responsibility and liability for
breaches, hacks, hijacks, and other harm resulting from insecure code. 262 By
using products associated with end-user agreements, consumers waive any
rights they have regarding the safety and security of the software. 263 More
concerning, only 8% of consumers even read this dense legalistic
disclaimer.264 Such end-user agreements make it difficult-if not
impossible-to bring product liability actions, particularly for breach of
warranty. 265
Implied warranties, on the other hand, are not expressly provided by
manufacturers, but are instead inferred when a manufacturer sells a product to
a consumer. 266 An implied warranty may arise from the circumstances
surrounding the transaction or from the product itself.267 Typical implied
warranties include the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the
implied warranty of merchantability for goods, and the implied warranty of
workmanlike quality for services. 268 Implied warranties, however, may be
disclaimed, and sellers often do this in either the contract or the end-user
licensing agreement. 269 Indeed, the implied warranty of merchantabilitywhich is intended to assure consumers that the goods will meet baseline
standards of quality-is so often disclaimed that scholars have questioned its

261. VITKOWSKY, supra note 240, at 16; see Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 59;
Wenzel, supra note 33, at 59; Beery & Bums, supra note 20, at 58; see Untangling the Web,
supra note 4. See generally DEAN, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that "buggy software is not
exceptional" in that programmers make an estimated ten to fifty errors for every one-thousand
lines of code that they write).
262. DEAN, supra note 14, at 10; Evans, supra note 17.
263. See Gonnan, supra note 43, at 4.
264. Lemos, supra note 18, at 2.
265. Beery & Bums, supra note 20.
266. See What are Express andImplied Warranties?, supra note 259.
267. See generally id. (explaining the circumstances in which an implied warranty may
arise).
268. Can Implied Warranty Protection Be Disclaimed?, ATTORNEYS.COM,
http://www.attomeys.com/consumer-law-and-protection/can-implied-warranty-protection-bedisclaimed [https://perma.cc/3JWX-3NX8].
269. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in
Software Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 393, 398 (1998); Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr. & Robert W.
Kanter, Be Wary of Warranties for Software Design, JONES DAY INSIGHTS (Aug.
2018), https://wwwjonesday.com/be-wary-of-warranties-for-software-design-08-27-2018/
[https://perma.cc/3KKX-VFHZ].
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usefulness. 270 Thus, given the absence of defect-free code and the prevalence
of end-user licensing agreements, products liability, in its various forms, is
not a viable cause of action for injured consumers.
B.

The Carrot and the Stick: Incentivizing Safer Code Through a New
Liability Framework

As JoMT continues to evolve and define consumer experiences and
expectations, it is crucial that safer code be prioritized in JoMT devices. As
noted above, JoMT device manufacturers are currently well insulated from
liability and are able to externalize the costs of insecure software. 271The threat
of liability, however, is a proven deterrent that can reduce the probability of
consumer harm or damage. 272 Because JoMT developers are underinvesting
in software security, it is necessary to create incentives that will be
economically and legally attractive to manufacturers. 273 This requires
combining "ex ante incentives to invest in security with ex post liability that,
while sufficient to discipline developers, does not stifle innovation." 274 The
goal is to balance consumer safety with technological advancement.275 Thus,
a reasonable and workable liability framework should be developed to provide
consumers with relief for injuries and clarify manufacturer responsibilities
and obligations.
The form that this new liability structure should take for JoMT devices,
however, is less clear. Traditional products liability principles cannot be
seamlessly applied to JoMT devices, given their unique design and extensive
supply chains that make it difficult to not only apportion liability but also to
determine relevant standards of care.276 A rigid liability structure risks stifling
innovation, but the laissez-faire attitude towards JoMT risks must be
combatted with effective incentives to develop secure code and reduce
consumer risk.277 Further, it is necessary that this liability structure be created

270. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 269, at 394.
271. Daley, supra note 31, at 538.
272. DEAN, supra note 14, at 9; see Merrion, supra note 35 ("JE]xperts on the Internet of
Things said class-action product liability lawsuits could help pressure manufacturers to build
more security into web-connected devices. . . . [L]itigation was mentioned repeatedly as a way
to get the attention of web device manufacturers in the near term.").
273. Daley, supra note 31, at 538.
274. Id. at 541.
275. Detsch, supra note 22.
276. See Beery & Burns, supra note 20; Untanglingthe Web, supra note 4.
277. See Daley, supra note 31, at 537-3 8; see, e.g., Lemos, supra note 18.
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with manufacturer input, and not on an ad hoc or case-by-case basis, which
risks inconsistent judicially-created standards. 278
While it is uncertain what a finalized liability framework for JoMT
devices may consist of, 279 there are two important steps that should be
implemented now to begin building this framework. First, JoMT developers
should be prohibited from disclaiming liability for insecure code in end-user
agreements. Second, a safe harbor provision should be simultaneously
implemented that provides JoMT manufacturers with a defense to liability if
they have satisfactorily complied with cybersecurity best practices in
developing and marketing their products. These recommendations can help
form the basis of a final liability framework while demonstrating an early
commitment to holding JoMT device manufacturers accountable for insecure
products.
C.

EliminatingLiability Disclaimers in End-User Agreements

The first prong of this interim liability proposal requires the elimination
of liability disclaimers in end-user agreements for JoMT devices. Software
vulnerabilities have cost consumers and businesses tens of billions of dollars
annually, yet software developers have refused to take responsibility for the
security of their products, and have instead shifted the risk of insecure
software to consumers. 28 0 It is unfair for consumers to shoulder the burden of
insecure devices-particularly when such devices can be implanted into
consumers' bodies and have life or death consequences-simply because
software manufacturers have traditionally been permitted to disclaim liability
through end-user agreements. 28 1 Permitting JoMT manufacturers to evade
liability contributes to the weak economic climate that has permitted
vulnerable code to develop in the first place.282
JoMT manufacturers should therefore not be free of all liability, but
instead should be held to reasonable standards of care for their products.283
IoMT developers are best positioned to identify risks with their software code

278. See Butler, supra note 21, at 927.
279. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that liability structures take time to develop).
280. Scott, supra note 19, at 426-27.
281. See Butler, supra note 21, at 926; Daley, supra note 31, at 538.
282. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 4; Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 52-53.
283. Butler, supra note 21, at 916 ("[H]olding manufacturers liable for downstream harms
caused by their insecure devices is well aligned with the purposes of products liability law-to
minimize harm by encouraging manufacturers (as a least-cost-avoider) to invest in security
measures."); see Detsch, supra note 22; see also Wenzel, supra note 33, at 67 (presenting a
similar argument for smart car technology).
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and to mitigate those risks during the development process. Yet, the presence
of an end-user licensing agreement eliminates any incentive that an JoMT
developer has to consider consumer safety and security.284 Without the risk of
liability, and without the presence of mandatory federal standards for JoMT
devices, manufacturers can place insecure products on the market without
adequate testing and potentially compromise consumer well-being. 285 For any
final JoMT liability model to be successful, there must be a foundational
understanding among all parties that the failure to implement reasonable
security measures into JoMT devices will be grounds for punishment. 286
Elimination of liability disclaimers in end-user agreements for JoMT products
is a crucial step in setting the foundation for a future liability framework.287
Such action will garner substantial attention among JoMT device
manufacturers, as it represents a significant shift away from the laissez-faire
attitude surrounding software products to date. 288 However, this shift is
necessary to establish standards for connected devices that have the potential
to cause serious bodily harm or death.
Further, attaching liability to JoMT developers can incentivize businesses
to increase their security budgets. 28 9 Respondents in the Ponemon study
indicated that their organizations would increase the security budget for
connected medical devices only if a potentially life threatening attack
occurred. 290 It is irresponsible to withhold adequate funding for security until
tragedy takes place, particularly given that the majority of JoMT
manufacturers are already aware of the real-life potential for such attacks.291
By signaling that JoMT device manufacturers may be held liable for insecure
code, the hope is that MedTech organizations will increase funding to
strengthen device security now, as a proactive measure, before harmful
attacks occur. The reactive model of security in place today fails to adequately
protect consumers, and it is time for the incentive of liability to enhance the
security environment.292

284. Daley, supra note 31, at 538.
285. Rosenzweig, supra note 19; see Daley, supra note 31, at 538 (describing the current
environment of under-investment in software security); see also Untanglingthe Web, supra note
4 (discussing the risk of loT devices caused by manufacturers that fail to provide security
measures).
286. See Daley, supra note 31, at 538.
287. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 26.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Daley, supra note 31, at 538.
See PONEMON INST., supra note 179, at 2, 10.
Id.
Id. at 1-2; see Rosenzweig, supra note 19.
See DEAN, supra note 14, at 12.
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Indeed, the idea of eliminating disclaimers of liability in end-user
agreements has also been recently proposed by Senator Mark Warner of
Virginia, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. 293 Senator Warner

explained that "eliminating software makers' long-held exemption from
liability lawsuits could be a key part of a cybersecurity plan," and that a
"fulsome debate" is needed regarding "whether the software sector's legal
immunity has outlived its usefulness, especially in an age of relentless
cyberattacks that frequently exploit software vulnerabilities." 294 Former
White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel agreed with Senator
Warner that it is lime to debate this proposal in Congress, but cautioned that
this dialogue should not be generalized to all software. 295 Instead, this
"requires a more sectoral approach, such as medical devices or autonomous
vehicles." 296 Such arguments and suggestions are in line with the approach
proposed in this Article, which advocates for elimination of liability
disclaimers in end-user agreements for the IoMT sector only, given the unique
risks posed by connected medical devices.
While prohibiting liability disclaimers in IoMT end-user agreements will
increase incentives for manufacturers to develop secure code, this action will
likely be met with substantial resistance from the software and connected
device industries. 297 The software industry has enjoyed protection from
liability for decades, and will oppose any change to this status quo. 298
Software manufacturers may argue that the imposition of liability will stifle
innovation in a developing field, and that manufacturers will flee the
industry. 299 The likelihood of this occurring, however, is slim. 300 Almost all
other industries hold manufacturers and developers liable for flaws in their
products, and IoMT is projected to revolutionize health care.301 The

293. See Mitchell, supra note 26.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. Daley, supra note 31, at 538, 542 (explaining that protectionfrom liability keeps costs
down).
299. Daley, supra note 31, at 537, 542; Evans, supra note 17; see also VITKOWSKY, supra
note 240, at 16 (explaining that some will argue holding software companies liable for defects
will "discourage innovation and growth"); Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 60 ("Extending
strict products liability to software defects could also dramatically obstruct technological
progress for the loT.").
300. See Daley, supra note 31, at 542.
301. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 59; see also Why You ProbablyDon't Have
ProductLiabilityfor the Software You Develop... Yet, INSUREON: YOU'RE IT (June 21, 2016),

https://it.insureon.com/news/why-you-probably-dont-have-product-liability-for-the-software-
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elimination of liability protection is unlikely to hinder a rapidly evolving
industry, given the numerous players in the market. Instead, the elimination
of liability provisions in end-user agreements will likely increase competition
among manufacturers to develop more secure products to avoid hefty fines or
damages.302 With manufacturers appropriately incentivized to prioritize
security, standards and duties of care can also begin to develop for this
industry. 303

Moreover, as technology changes, liability structures must adapt. Just
because policy makers determined that "business productivity software
manufacturers should not be held liable for security flaws in their products
during the growth period of this industry in the 1990s does not mean all
software manufacturers for all applications in all industries should get the
same exemption forever." 304 Instead, there must be a balancing of consumer
safety with manufacturer liability. 305 As consumer risks increase, technology
manufacturers must bear some of the burden for device safety. 306 Because
society has entered a new technological age marked by increased cyber risk,
it is crucial that liability models progress accordingly. 307
D. Cybersecurity Safe Harbor
Given that the elimination of liability waivers in end-user agreements will
represent a marked change for software and JoMT manufacturers, it is
important that these manufacturers not be exposed to unbounded liability.
Depending on the final liability model that emerges, it is necessary to guard
against the imposition of liability on JoMT developers merely because their
products use software code or connect over Internet networks. As noted, there
is no defect-free code in existence today, and manufacturers should not be

you-develop-yet [https://perna.cc/UX2H-K28C]; Evans, supra note 17 (discussing industries
that are subject to liability).
302. See generally ABBOTT & THE CHERTOFF GRP., WHY MEDICAL DEVICE
MANUFACTURERS MUST LEAD ON CYBERSECURITY IN AN INCREASINGLY CONNECTED
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 6 (2018) ("[C]ybersecurity should not function as a competitive

differentiator, but as a uniform device enabler."); Rosenzweig, supra note 19 (discussing some
federal organizations consideration of fines for violating cybersecurity "best practices").
303. See Wenzel, supra note 33, at 69.
304. Mitchell, supra note 26.
305. See Detsch, supra note 22.

306. See id. ("[L]eading digital security experts are calling on US policymakers to hold
manufacturers liable for software vulnerabilities in their products in an effort to prevent the bugs
commonly found in smartphones and desktops from pervading the emerging loT space.").
307. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that liability structures take time to develop);
Evans, supra note 17.
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liable at this stage for device malfunctions, hacks, or hijacks that occur despite
the manufacturer's use of cybersecurity best practices and secure product
development lifecycles.3 08 The purpose of a robust liability framework is, in
part, to incentivize the development of secure code.3 09 It is not intended to

'

saddle manufacturers with liability risks that no reasonable individual could
guard against, even if all proper steps were taken. 3 10 Thus, a second proposal
should be simultaneously adopted with the elimination of liability waivers:
cybersecurity safe harbors.3 1
A cybersecurity safe harbor operates by preventing the imposition of
liability on device manufacturers that adopt and adhere to recognized industry
cybersecurity standards, frameworks, or both. 3 12 The safe harbor prioritizes
proactive cybersecurity measures that protect consumer well-being instead of
focusing on the reactive regulatory structure that exists today.313 These
industry frameworks can help fill the gaps that presently exist in cybersecurity
and JoMT oversight by HHS and the FDA, and can be more readily and easily
updated and amended than statutes or regulations. 314
Moreover, safe harbors that encourage adoption of industry-developed
cybersecurity frameworks enhance the public-private partnership model that
has become a cornerstone of cybersecurity policy. 315 By design, cyberspace
operates as "a network of both private-sector and public-sector infrastructure"
and "requires a continuation of the partnership between the government and
companies" to thrive. 316 There are limits to the government's technical skills
and ability to develop workable practices for cybersecurity that are best left to
industry cybersecurity experts. A partnership approach, such as the one
envisioned by safe harbors, can enhance development of the JoMT and

308. Paez & La Marca, supra note 5, at 59; Beery & Bums, supra note 20, at 58.
309. See DEAN, supra note 14, at 8-10; Scott, supra note 19, at 469; Ashton, supra note
28, at 834-35; Merrion, supra note 35.
310. See Scott, supra note 19, at 469-70.
311. See, e.g., Daley, supra note 31, at 541; Wenzel, supra note 33, at 69.
312. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1354.01-05 (West, Westlaw through Files I to
9, immediately effective RC sections of File 10, and Files 11 to 14 of the 133rd General
Assembly (2019-2020)).
313. Jeff Kosseff, Positive CybersecurityLaw: Creatinga ConsistentandIncentive-Based
System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 403 (2016) ("[Plositive cybersecurity law," such as incentives,
"requires a shift in thinking from our nation's longstanding mindset in which nearly all
cybersecurity laws are punitive.").
314. See Davenport, supra note 12, at 260; Klein, supra note 193.
315. See Corbin& Brown, supra note 191.
316. Kosseff, supra note 313, at 411; see U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13636: IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 4 (2013).
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cybersecurity industries without stifling innovation.3 17 It is therefore strongly
recommended that cybersecurity safe harbors be adopted simultaneously with
the prohibition on liability waivers in IoMT end-user agreements.318
State legislatures have already begun to recognize the merit in adopting
cybersecurity safe harbors. On November 1, 2018, Ohio became the first state
to supplement its Data Protection Act with an "incentive-based mechanism to
strengthen cybersecurity business practices"-namely a safe harbor against
data breach lawsuits for businesses that "implement, maintain and comply
with an industry-recognized cybersecurity program." 3 19 This law, formerly
known as S.B. 220, offers protection to any business that accesses, maintains,
or processes personal information, so long as the business implements
recognized cybersecurity measures that are designed to: (1) protect the
security and confidentiality of data; (2) protect against reasonably anticipated
threats to the security or integrity of data; and (3) guard against unauthorized
access to personal information that is likely to result in a material risk of
identity theft or fraud. 320 In exchange for implementing an appropriate
cybersecurity framework, businesses receive an affirmative defense to tort
actions that arise from alleged "failure[s] to implement reasonable
information security controls, resulting in a data breach." 321
Similarly, New York recently passed the Stop Hacks and Improve
Electronic Data Security (SHIELD) Act.322 The original version of this bill
intended to grant a safe harbor to a "certified compliant entity." 323 A "certified

compliant entity" is one that meets the independent certification of
compliance with government data security regulations (such as HIPAA and

317. See Kosseff, supra note 313, at 403.
318. See, e.g., Daley, supra note 31, at 541.
319. Alysa Austin et al., Ohio EnactsFirst CybersecuritySafe Harbor, JD SUPRA (NOV.

7, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ohio-enacts-first-cybersecurity-safe-80727/
[https://perma.cc/X5CT-8A82]; see Data Protection Act, S.B. 220, 132nd Gen. Assemb. (Ohio
2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1354.01-1354.05 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 9,
immediately effective RC sections of File 10, and Files 11 to 14 of the 133rd General Assembly
(2019-2020)).
320. Austin et al., supra note 319.
321. Id.
322. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-bb (McKinney 2019) (effective Mar. 21, 2020).

323. S. 6933, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); cf Romaine Marshall & Craig
Stewart, Safe Harborfor Data Security: New York's ProposedChanges Could Be Followedby
Other States, Legal Insights, HOLLAND & HART (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.hollandhart.com/

safe-harbors-for-cybersecurity-new-yorks-proposed-changes-could-be-followed-by-otherstates [https://penna.cc/9ARK-BJE3] (describing another New York act, the Stop Hacks and
Improve Electronic Data Security Act, as an amendment that includes a safe harbor provision

for companies that obtain certification).
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley) or recognized industry-approved cybersecurity
frameworks, including the ISO/NIST standards.3 24 Pursuant to the original
legislation, an organization could take advantage of this safe harbor by
providing copies of its certification(s) to the Attorney General.3 25 The final
legislation, however, omitted this broad safe harbor language with respect to
limiting liability for certified compliant entities, but still allows certain
companies to be deemed compliant with New York's "reasonable safeguards"
requirement if they are covered by-and comply with-certain regulations,
such as HIPAA.3 26 Thus, while there is flexibility in how cybersecurity safe
harbors are structured, it is necessary to provide a level of protection to
manufacturers as liability increases for insecure JoMT devices. This can
incentivize adoption of safer code and more stringent cybersecurity programs
by providing a more limited and tailored exception to liability than end-user
agreements. 327
In fact, numerous organizations expressed their support for the
development of cybersecurity safe harbors in response to a request for
comments issued by the Department of Homeland Security.3 28 Tasked with
evaluating and recommending incentives to encourage private sector
participation in voluntary cybersecurity programs, the Secretary considered
liability limitations as part of her review.3 29 Organizations of all sizes
-including large companies like Microsoft and small start-up companies-

324. See Marshall & Stewart, supra note 323.
325. See S. 6933, 2017-2018 Leg.
326. Alejandro Cruz & W. Scott Kim, New York's SHIELD Act Heads to the Governor s
Desk, JD SUPRA (July 9, 2019), https://www jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-s-shield-actheads-to-the-49736/ [https://penna.cc/QZY5-HELK].
327. See generally Scott, supra note 19, at 469 (arguing that imposing liability on software
companies will encourage more security measures); Ashton, supra note 28, at 834-35 (arguing
that incentives will help to produce safer and more consistent security measures for software
products); Merrion, supra note 35; Rosenzweig, supra note 19 (discussing the current use of
end-user agreements in software contracts which disclaim liability).
328. See generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global CybersecurityStandardof
Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping
Reasonable National and InternationalCybersecurity Practices, 50 TEx. INT'L L.J. 305, 343,
345 (2015) ("The incentive reports issued by the DHS . . included discussion on some form of
limited liability for companies who voluntarily adopt the Framework."); U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 316, at 62 ("A common suggestion among respondents was the
need for indemnity, at some level, from liability for security breaches [for] organizations
adopting cybersecurity measures."); NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., DISCUSSION OF
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT ON INCENTIVES FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
OWNERS AND OPERATORS TO JOIN A VOLUNTARY CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM 11 (2013).
329. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
CYBERSECURITY INCENTIVES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636, at 2-3, 10-12 (2013).
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indicated that liability safe harbors offset the costs of participation in
voluntary cybersecurity frameworks and can serve as an effective cost
reduction mechanism.33 0 These companies further explained that liability
protection creates tangible benefits and adds predictability to an otherwise
unclear and unsettled area of law.331 Moreover, these safe harbors recognize
the inherent flaws present in all connected devices and signal that targeted
loMT organizations are also victims of cybercrime. 33 2
It is important, however, that cybersecurity safe harbors be implemented
in conjunction with the end-user agreement prohibition, and not as the sole
method to enhance device security. The rationale for this is that the adoption
of a cybersecurity safe harbor, on its own, fails to incentivize manufacturers
to increase the security of their loMT products. JoMT device manufacturers
will still have a shield against liability through end-user agreements. With the
ability to contractually limit their liability for insecure code, manufacturers
will remain un-incentivized to protect consumer welfare and can continue
placing unsecure devices on the market.333 Additionally, given the limited loT
lawsuits to date, as well as courts' varying interpretations of standing
requirements, loMT manufacturers may question whether such lawsuits can
be successfully maintained.334 An loMT manufacturer may believe it is
cheaper to fight a future lawsuit-with a potential for success at the motion to
dismiss stage depending on the jurisdiction and harm suffered by the
plaintiff-than to implement a comprehensive cybersecurity program. A
recent survey of over 800 companies noted that only 35% of organizations
currently view regulatory or liability risk as one of the largest concerns

330. See Letter from Robert W. Holleyman, II, President & CEO, BSA, to Alfred Lee,
NTIA (Apr. 29, 2013).
331. See HITRUST, FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING CYBER RISKS TO CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 10 (2017); Letter from Jim Wunderman President & CEO, Bay Area
Council, to The Honorable Dennis Hightower, Deputy Sec'y, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech.
(July 29, 2011).
332. Craig Spiezle, Uber, Equifax Hacks Signal Need for Accountability and Breach

Regulation, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.com/uber-equifax-hackssignal-need-accountability-breach-regulation-2623606 [https://penna.cc/YVQ6-FHEB].
333. See Daley, supra note 31, at 538; Lemos, supra note 18 ("What we have is an
incentive gap, and we are not going to see something different unless we incentivize something
different.").
334. See generally Doug Olenick, loT Liability: Legal Issues Abound, SC MEDIA (Mar.
30,
2017),
https://www.scmagazine.com/iot-liability-legal-issues-abound/article/647579/
[https://penm. cc/U42Y-8CMB] (discussing that "few cases have been filed" regarding loT
liability, so case law is sparse).
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associated with poor cybersecurity practices.335 In the IoMT context, this may
be because of the insufficient regulatory structures and ability to contractually
avoid liability.336 Without fear of liability, organizations are not properly
incentivized to adopt a voluntary cybersecurity framework.33 7 Thus, safe
harbors are a crucial component of the new liability framework, but will fail
to achieve their purpose if enacted as the sole remedy.
Combining liability and safe harbors into a joint proposal, therefore,
offers sufficient incentives for manufacturers to not only continue investing
in the IoMT industry, but to also adopt appropriate cybersecurity frameworks
and strengthen the code that is used in connected medical devices.338 This
model represents an appropriate balancing of consumers' need for safer
products with manufacturers' need to prevent unlimited liability in a nascent
industry with ever-evolving standards.33 9 By taking these first two steps
towards creating a comprehensive IoMT liability structure, the legislature can
demonstrate its commitment to medical device security while helping the
industry grow in a safe and secure manner.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is undeniable that IoMT is set to revolutionize the healthcare industry
and redefine standards for patient care. Utilizing its connectivity to monitor
chronic patient conditions and increase care convenience, IoMT contains
fascinating new opportunities, with manufacturers only scratching the surface
to date. As IoMT becomes more readily adopted, however, it presents
challenges with respect to device security and patient safety that can result in
consumer harm or death. 340 With risks for data breaches, hacks, and hijacking
increasing in the medical industry, it is essential that IoMT manufacturers
create secure products that do not expose consumers to unnecessary

335. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: How
MISALIGNED INCENTIVES WORK AGAINST CYBERSECURITY 3, 7 (2017).
336. See Lemos, supra note 18.
337. See Carrotsfor Cybersecurity, BLADE (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.toledoblade.com/
Editorials/2017/12/04/Carrots-for-cybersecurity.htil [https://penna.cc/77UT-L6WT]; see also
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 316, at 62.
338. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 14, at 8-10 (explaining that liability incentivizes
developers to weigh the cost of mitigating known defects with the potential for large damages);
Ashton, supra note 28, at 834-35; Merrion, supra note 35.
339. See generally Detsch, supra note 22 (explaining the need to balance the security of
consumers with the technology development of software companies).
340. See supra Part I.
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vulnerabilities and risks. 34' Unfortunately, given the legal and regulatory
frameworks in place, appropniate incentives do not exist for JoMT
manufacturers to prioritize device security.342 Manufacturers may avoid
liability through end-user agreements and can fall outside the bounds of
regulatory oversight by HHS and FDA.343 As new devices proliferate on the
market, however, it is essential that a comprehensive liability structure be
created to incentivize adoption of cybersecurity best practices and provide
relief to injured consumers.
The two-prong approach to liability proposed in this Article operates as a
foundation for the broader JoMT liability discussion and ultimate liability
framework. This interim proposal creates incentives to secure JoMT products
by eliminating manufacturers' ability to disclaim liability and proposing the
adoption of safe harbors that can restrict liability to reasonable levels if
manufacturers comply with voluntary cybersecurity frameworks.3 44 The goal
is to signal a strong interest by the legislature in holding JoMT manufacturers
accountable for the security of their products while recognizing the reality that
no JoMT device will ever be 100% secure. Further, by implementing these
two steps now, the legislature can help foster a dialogue on what the ultimate
JoMT liability framework should consist of, and can encourage, JoMT
manufacturers to participate in this discussion at an early stage. This prevents
the imposition of an ad hoc liability framework by the judiciary.3 45 The
adoption of a comprehensive JoMT liability structure will result in
consistency and predictability for manufacturers while benefiting consumers
through safer code and remedies for unreasonably insecure devices.
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at 538.

345. See Butler, supra note 21, at 927 (noting that without clear guidance, loT tort
outcomes by courts come become random).
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